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JUDICIAL DISCRETION: IS ONE MORE OF A 
GOOD THING TOO MUCH? 
David B. Sentelle* 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION. By Aharon Barak. Translated from the He-
brew by Yadin Kaufmann. New Haven: Yale University. 1989. Pp. 
xiv, 270. $27.50. 
In reviewing this text1 by a Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel, 
I am mindful of the duty of anyone who writes for publication. Be-
cause the reader has given up something, specifically time or energy 
that might have been devoted to other entertaining or informative pur-
suits, the writer has a duty to provide something in return, that is, 
entertainment or information. Since few read reviews of legal texts for 
entertainment, the law book reviewer is obligated to provide informa-
tion. That information should, I think, answer the following three 
questions: (1) Is this a "good" book? (2) Given a finite amount of 
time for side reading in the law, is this book a worthwhile expenditure 
of one's time? (3) Given a finite budget for the expansion of one's law 
library, should one buy this book? In the case of Justice Barak's newly 
translated text, the answer to the first question is certainly "yes"; the 
answer to the second, at least for American readers, is "probably not"; 
and the answer to the third is "no." 
As to whether this is a good book, as I said, it is. Justice Barak 
writes clearly, treats subjects thoroughly, organizes well, and has pro-
duced a text that is a good deal more readable than many legal writers 
are capable of crafting. He draws on a broad personal background, 
having been a law professor at Hebrew University Law School since 
1960, its Dean from 1974 to 1975, and serving several years as his 
country's attorney general, which involved service as legal advisor to 
peace negotiations with Egypt, including Camp David. Since 1978 he 
has served on his nation's highest court. 
Barak draws from a wealth of material - Israeli, English, Ameri-
can, and French - heavily skewed to English-language sources. His 
aim is set out on the first page of his preface to the book: to answer 
the question, "How is the judge to exercise his discretion in the 'hard 
cases,' those in which he faces a number oflawful possibilities as to the 
legal norm itself?" (p. ix). He recognizes and draws from the wealth 
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of suggested answers already in the literature, considering a range of 
options from traditional-declaratory to positivist-realist thought - a 
spectrum of sources including Frank, Hart, and Dworkin. He cites 
and relies on Cardozo and Holmes, and conspicuously Justice Moshe 
Landau of his own Supreme Court. 
Even in translation (and I confess that I lack the ability to read 
him in the original Hebrew), he displays a crisp, well-paced style, 
avoiding the pedantry and viscosity so many writers on the "heavier" 
legal topics either prefer, or can't escape. 
Nonetheless, my answer to the second question remains negative. 
The American reader with finite time for side reading in the law prob-
ably should not expend it on this volume. Granted, Justice Barak has 
dealt with the problem of judge as lawmaker, and judge as bridger-of-
the-gaps-in-the-law in a skillful and scholarly fashion. Granted, he 
has done a craftsman-like job compiling the best, or at least the most 
representative thoughts on this subject - from Montesquieu to Car-
dozo, Hart, and Dworkin, with stops along the way for Greenawalt 
and Raz and various others, including a couple of my colleagues. 
Even so, it still probably isn't worth the time of any legal reader who 
lacks the deepest and widest interest in the subject. 
Barak thoroughly carves the kernel from each of his varied 
sources. The problem is, having compiled the kernels into a single 
text, he adds very little to what he has compiled. Consider the first 
section of his two-section work, which is devoted to the sources of 
judicial discretion. The central analysis here (an analysis which un-
derlies the second section treating "[!]imitations of [j]udicial 
[d]iscretion" (p. 11)) depends upon a division of the universe of cases 
into three categories - "easy," "intermediate," and "hard" (pp. 36-
40). Barak first describes the easy cases: "many are the legal norms 
whose meaning with respect to a given system of facts is so simple and 
clear that their application involves no judicial discretion" (p. 36). 
Similarly, in the intermediate cases, "in the final analysis, the judge 
has no discretion in deciding them," but 
[w]hat sets them apart from the easy cases is ... that in the intermediate 
cases both sides appear to have a legitimate legal argument supporting 
their position. A conscious act of interpretation is needed before the 
judge can conclude that the argument is in fact groundless and that there 
is only one lawful solution. [p. 39] 
In the third category, the hard cases, "the judge is faced with a 
number of possibilities, all of which are lawful within the context of 
the system" (p. 40). 
Certainly, there is nothing wrong with this analysis. Barak is eas-
ily able to find support for everything he writes about each of his cate-
gories. The trouble is, he is too easily able to find support. The 
analysis and almost everything he says about each category within his 
analysis is not only documentable, it has been documented. For exam-
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ple, the three categories into which he has divided the litigation uni-
verse differ only slightly in terminology from the same analysis 
conducted by my colleague Harry T. Edwards in his article The Role 
of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in 
Federal Appellate Adjudication. 2 Barak's analysis of his three catego-
ries differs hardly at all from Judge Edwards' analysis of cases divided 
into "easy," "hard," and "very hard" categories.3 Edwards, in turn, 
draws from and cites Greenawalt's Discretion and Judicial Decision: 
The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges. 4 Barak, Edwards, 
and Greenawalt all hark back to Justice Cardozo's book, The Nature 
of Judicial Process. 5 
Let me make it emphatically clear that I am in no way accusing 
Barak of plagiarism. He cites all his sources, and gives full credit 
everywhere it is due. The problem is, he adds very little to it. 
Although he applies the three-division universe of cases to a broader 
field than did Edwards - Barak treats all cases, not only appellate 
ones - this difference is almost immaterial to an understanding of 
jurisprudence. Thus, the reader who wishes only a synopsis of legal 
thought on the jurisprudential or philosophical underpinnings of judi-
cial discretion as a source of law, and on the implications of the exer-
cise of judicial discretion for the development of the body of law can 
· spend less time and effort on the Edwards and Greenawalt articles 
while missing little that the Barak volume could add to those two ex-
cellent treatments. The reader wishing an in-depth knowledge, and 
who is willing and able to expend the time and effort, is far better 
advised to go to Barak's sources at the outset than to spend a few 
hours reading what amounts to a compendium only to wind up read-
ing the sources anyway. 
This lack of novelty pervades the text. In the section on limits of 
judicial discretion, for example, in a chapter dealing with judicial pol-
icy and models of adjudication, Barak does a fine, brief job of explain-
ing three models: the declaratory model, the policy model, and the 
model of legislation as an incident to adjudication. As to the first, the 
declaratory model, he rejects the idea drawn from Montesquieu that 
"[t]he judge is the mouthpiece of the legislature and repeats the lan-
guage of the law" (p. 230), just as he rejects Blackstone's idea that 
"[t]he judge expounds the rule hidden in the system" (p. 230). Even 
in his brief treatment he gives a passing wave to Dworkin as a modern 
apostle of a similar model. While he sees in the model some positive 
2. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modem Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in 
Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 389-92 (1984). 
3. Id. 
4. Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind 
Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975). 
5. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
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features, he rejects it "as a model of judging," because "it does not 
reflect reality and is useless. It is based on a fiction . . . . " (p. 232). 
As to the policy model, under which "the judge determines the 
society's values as he sees them and formulates the law accordingly" 
(p. 231 ), thus affording the judge absolute discretion, he gives a good 
roadmap to its history in two brief but well-documented paragraphs. 
He notes its support among the "realists" of the 1930s and its reflec-
tion in the views of the modern Critical Legal Studies school (p. 231). 
He then rejects it as an inappropriate model, which does not describe 
judicial reality, and, when taken to its extreme, reaches the end of 
adjudication, as distinct from legislation (p. 232). Finally, he accepts 
the model of limited judicial discretion, represented by "legislation as 
an incident to adjudication" (p. 232). He notes its consistency with 
modern positivists and the members of the legal process school, citing 
Hart, McCormick, Sacks, and Fuller (p. 232). 
Again, everything he has to say is most interesting, but his conclu-
sion adds little or nothing to Chief Justice Holmes' formulation in his 
Southern Pacific Company v. Jenson dissent:6 "I recognize without 
hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only 
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." In-
sofar as further analysis is required, Cardozo added that to the Eng-
lish-language treatment of the subject decades ago, 7 and at least a 
sufficient body of scholarship has since been erected on the Holmes 
and Cardozo foundation by Hart, Dworkin, and probably too many 
others. 
I am not as disparaging of Justice Barak's book as I may sound in 
these last few paragraphs. I am not saying that he wasted the time of 
all readers in writing the book, for this is not the case at all. I am 
simply saying that the reading of it may not be worth the time of the 
American or British reader. I do not doubt that Justice Barak's work 
is a worthwhile addition to the legal scholarship of modern Israel. 
That ancient nation is still a young state. Because modern Israel be-
gan its separate legal structure - as distinct from its British colonial 
roots - only in 1948, it is likely that legal scholarship there does not 
yet offer the wealth of theoretical and philosophical treatments of the 
judge as lawfinder or lawgiver abounding in the English language. My 
suspicion is strengthened by Barak's heavy reliance on English-lan-
guage -i.e., British and American- sources. No doubt, his work is 
a valuable contribution to the foundation of the independent thought 
of a separate Israeli jurisprudence. Some day, Barak and Landau may 
occupy in Israeli legal scholarship a role not unlike that of Cardozo 
and Holmes in American jurisprudence. But again, the American 
reader already has Holmes and Cardozo and volumes of scholarly 
6. 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
7. See B. CARDOZO, supra note 5. 
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treatments of their judicial thought. I therefore doubt that many 
American readers will find the volume - well-done though it is -
worth the expenditure of finite side-reading time. 
As to the prospect of purchasing the book, I merely reiterate what 
I just said about reading it. If you want to add it to your library, you 
might find it a valuable source for quick reference to other writers on 
judicial discretion, including the legal realists, positivists, and the like. 
But I doubt that it would leave the shelves in most American law li-
braries after the first reading for anything other than a reference guide 
to other sources. Judicial Discretion will undoubtedly be a valuable 
source in Israel, but not in the United States. 
